Over the past decade, enforcement of this ban by the United States has surged. FCPA enforcement has yielded record fines and disgorgements of profit totaling more than $5 billion, exacted prison sentences up to 15 years for individuals, and created far--reaching consequences for anti--bribery enforcement in other jurisdictions. As FCPA enforcement has grown, so has the corpus of media analysis and legal scholarship -particularly from international business lawyersdevoted to examining, explaining, and commenting on this legislation and its impact on business 2 .
Not surprisingly, most of the FCPA literature includes considerable consternation among business--oriented observers that the enforcement agencies have become "overzealous" in their focus on the FCPA, which has sharply increased the risks and altered the calculus of international commercial ventures 3 .
Taking a close look at the data on FCPA enforcement actions since 2003, the present study reveals two notable trends. 4 The first is, indeed, the trend of increased enforcement. As others have noted, there have been significantly more enforcement actions in the past decade than ever beforeagainst both corporations and individuals -yielding greater penalties. Expanded enforcement has proceeded especially on an unprecedented reliance on deferred--prosecution and non--prosecution agreements to exact penalties and ensure the implementation of robust corporate compliance regimes among those suspected of foreign bribery. The impact of these "diversion agreements" on FCPA enforcement is, among other ramifications, such that the trend of expanded enforcement is likely to continue.
The second notable trend is the application of increasingly expansive notions of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the enforcement of the FCPA. Over the past decade US agencies have increasingly enforced the FCPA against foreign issuers and foreign nationals for behaviour undertaken outside the territory of the United States. In tandem with the use of diversion agreements -which replace costly trials but also preclude the production of judicial decisions and the development of case law on such matters -the enforcement agencies have expanded the theories of jurisdiction upon which they base their claims to authority over bribery abroad. Interestingly, they have been doing so in ways that run counter to trends in other areas of law where U.S. courts have been limiting the extraterritorial application of American law. Extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) extends the scope and reach of national laws into global regulatory environments and into other sovereign territories. as anti--trust, export control, and securities regulation -ETJ increasingly is the subject of attention and controversy in international legal scholarship concerning human rights, transnational crime, and other issues 5 . This literature has yet to grapple with extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti--corruption law, which is quickly becoming a defining feature of the global governance of corruption.
The twin trends of expanded FCPA enforcement and expanded jurisdiction in FCPA enforcement, therefore, are important not just for practitioners and commercial enterprises seeking to avoid running afoul of the law. Such active extra--territorial enforcement of the US foreign corrupt practices act also carries important implications in the global governance of corruption, generally.
It exemplifies the ways in which American legal frameworks, politics, and public policy are being actively exported by U.S. enforcement authorities, thereby shaping and constraining global politics including the expanded use of diversion agreements in enforcement -and the expansion of jurisdiction -including recent illustrative cases. Part three discusses the implications of these trends, in two dimensions. The first, citing research in political science and international relations, shows how US enforcement of the FCPA has been instrumental in promoting anti--corruption policies and enforcing anti--corruption legislation globally, and in banning bribes abroad. At the same time, the application of the FCPA across borders -to persons and circumstances occurring outside the territory of the United States -both shapes and constrains international anti--corruption efforts in ways that may be unintended but which may nevertheless run counter to effective governance practices and meaningful anti--corruption reform in the global economy. Three aspects of FCPA enforcement in particular constrain the broader goals of global anti--corruption governance: the narrow conception of corruption upon which the FCPA is based; the strategic trade frame which underlies the FCPA's internationalization; and the legitimacy problems these suggest. Building on established interdisciplinary International Law/International Relations (IL/IR) scholarship, the paper concludes with suggestions for such interdisciplinary work on the global governance of bribery and corruption, and calls for a new IL/IR agenda of research on extraterritorial jurisdiction in international law, generally.
Background and Context: The Global Anti--Corruption Regime

The Global Governance of Bribery and Corruption
Corruption emerged as a primary item on the global governance agenda, as well as on the agenda of U.S. foreign policy, beginning in the mid--1990s. 6 Most contemporary research on corruption -most simply defined as the abuse of public power for private gain, but involving complex patterns and wide--ranging manifestations -reveals that corruption is a harmful problem, causing damaging outcomes across a range of concerns in the international political economy ----which makes its control an important focus of international policy. Corruption distorts markets, disrupts international flows of goods and capital, and reduces economic growth. Some estimates show that the cost of corruption amounts to more than 5% of global GDP (US$ 2.6 trillion) with more than US$ 1 trillion paid in bribes each year 7 . In international business, bribery impedes fair market competition and obstructs liberal international trade. By paying bribes corrupt firms gain an unfair business advantage against more efficient firms and raise the cost of doing business for all. The cost of bribes can escalate, and the advantages gained become increasingly unreliable.
Insofar as corruption includes the "capture" of public institutions and regulatory bodies by powerful private interests, it has been identified by some as the key underlying cause of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis 8 .
Corruption also impedes sustainable development and perpetuates poverty. Resources intended to assist development and alleviate global poverty are often diverted through corruption and aid does not reach its intended recipients. Corruption can lead to indiscriminate lending for development projects which fill the pockets of bureaucrats rather than the stomachs of the hungry.
In The White Man's Burden William Easterly notes how trillions of dollars of foreign aid spent on grandiose development projects since the 1960s have been wasted, and billions outright stolen due to corruption, causing costs to democracy, human rights, global health, and the environment 9 .
Corruption also degrades the quality of goods and services provided, with sometimes catastrophic social costs -substandard housing and public health systems, substandard medicine and health care, dangerous industrial conditions, and vulnerability to natural disasters. As the anti--corruption NGO Transparency International emphasizes, the poor and disempowered suffer the most from corruption, which often goes hand in hand with violence and persistent poverty 10 .
Corruption undermines democracy, human rights, and human security. It feeds political instability, sustains inequality, undermines public trust in society's institutions of governance, leads to social unrest, and supports the proliferation of transnational crime. Criminal penalties under the Act included fines of up to $2 million dollars for firms, and up to $100,000 and five years' imprisonment for individuals.
This unilateral constraint on US businesses arose as a result of Watergate--related revelations about foreign corrupt practices undertaken by major US corporations, the ethical resonance of which led legislators to enact the FCPA, regardless of countervailing material strategic trade considerations and regardless of opposition by otherwise powerful business groups.
Subsequent efforts to repeal or amend the FCPA were impeded by the post--Watergate significance of the deeply held norm of anti--corruption, which was explicitly articulated in the FCPA. 13 Thus from the outset, U.S. corporations and business groups strongly opposed this constraint on their ability to compete for business abroad against competitors in France, Germany, the UK, and elsewhere, who remained unconstrained from paying bribes to win contracts.
Nevertheless, a decade of lobbying to repeal the Act's anti--bribery provisions failed to yield the results US businesses wanted: to be able to legally offer bribes for business in countries where, they argued, corrupt practices were the acceptable norm. Instead, in 1988 Congress amended the FCPA to clarify and strengthen (rather than repeal) its regulatory requirements and to require the President to seek to internationalize anti--bribery rules through negotiations at the OECD. 14 The FCPA in the 1990s: Policy Internationalization and the OECD Convention
As a result, the United States became an international norm leader on anti--corruption and a crucial player in the emergence of a regime to govern corruption in the global economy.
Specifically: a binding international treaty at the OECD to criminalize transnational bribery.
Notwithstanding the powerful normative context of the FCPA, the motivation for US leadership on international anti--bribery rules at the OECD in the 1990s and beyond lay not in normative concerns, but in strategic trade calculations. Although the United States did not prefer a legally--binding treaty commitment to ban transnational bribery, it agreed to one at the behest of France and Germany, its partners in the OECD who wanted to be sure that if they were to repeal their own standard practices of permitting the tax--deductibility of foreign bribes, the United States would be constrained by a binding commitment (as opposed to a "merely" hortatory norm) to vigorously enforce its own anti--bribery measures. As a state--supported strategic trade practice, transnational bribery presents a prisoner's dilemma for states and firms competing for international business, and US--prompted negotiations for anti--bribery rules at the OECD, resulted in a binding multilateral signatories to outlaw a wide range of corrupt activities -including bribery of national and foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations; embezzlement and misuse of funds in both the public and private sector; laundering the proceeds of crime; obstruction of justice;
and more -and has spawned the UNCAC Civil Society Coalition, which unites over 350 civil society organizations from over 100 countries in a global network aimed at promoting the ratification, implementation, and ongoing monitoring of the UNCAC and other anti--corruption initiatives. 16 Most recently, the G20 group of states has formed a standing anti--corruption working group to promote private sector transparency and integrity, international cooperation on asset recovery regimes, and the prevention of corruption in the global extractive, fisheries, forestry, and construction industries. 17 Beyond the FCPA, clearly, the global governance of bribery and corruption is growing. 18 Technically, BAE was not actually charged with an FCPA liability. Alongside a guilty plea to charges by the UK Serious Fraud Office (yielding what many observers considered to be a paltry fine of £30M), BAE pleaded guilty in the United States to violating both the US Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms regulations as well as to conspiring to defraud the United States by impairing and impeding its lawful functions and to make false statements about its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act compliance program. Nevertheless, this action is included in the Shearman and Sterling database of FCPA enforcement actions and is widely accepted as a FCPA enforcement action. 19 One is also tempted to contrast Breuer's commitment to the deterrent value of the prosecution under the FCPA of (admittedly, primarily non--U.S.) executives with his consistent refusal to do so in connection with One reason to pursue cases against individuals is to prevent corporations from treating fines and penalties as a mere cost of doing business. In addition to the $800 million fines and penalties collected in the Siemens case, for instance, eight executives went to jail. Another reason to pursue cases against individuals may be to secure cooperation in building larger cases against corporate entities or industries as a whole. This appears to have been at play in the case of Albert "Jack" (New York, 2012) . 21 On the other hand Koehler The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in a New Era (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014) . argues that that the emphasis on individual enforcement may be nothing so much as cheap talk and empty rhetoric, as the vast majority of FCPA enforcement actions are against corporations -possibly because these are the source of more lucrative fines and penalties, especially since the use of corporate DPAs and NPAs (discussed below) makes them easier to conclude. The longest sentence imposed on an individual for FCPA violations remains 15 years, given to Joel Esquanazi, the former president of a US--based telecommunications firm, who conspired to pay more than $890,000 over several years to shell companies for the purpose of bribing Haitian government officials in exchange for various business advantages, including preferred telecommunications rates and continued telecommunications connections with Haiti. Esquanazi's co--defendant received a seven--year sentence; both sentences were upheld on appeal in 2014. At the time the Department of Justice noted the sentence would be "a stark reminder to executives that bribing government officials to secure business advantages is a serious crime with serious Arthur Anderson scandal, in which the firm itself went bankrupt and thousands of people lost their jobs due to the malfeasance of a relatively small unit of the company, DOJ views DPAs and NPAs as a sort of corporate harm--reduction strategy in an era of heightened enforcement. Not least, it also seems this new approach to prosecution has been a boon for the extraction of ever--greater financial penalties.
Enforcement of the
In addition to securing cooperation, influencing corporate culture, mitigating systemic risk to defendants and generating lucrative fines, prosecution diversion agreements avoid lengthy investigations, costly evidence gathering and expensive trials. By the same token, however, as critics have noted, enforcement via DPA and NPA has facilitated the extra--judicial enforcement authority of the DOJ and the SEC, in which the absence of trial judgments precludes the development of case law which might limit the reach of FCPA enforcement and on which FCPA defenses might otherwise be based 29 .
Will the trend of expanded enforcement continue? Another notable aspect of increased enforcement serves somewhat as a caveat: the data reveal sharp spikes in enforcement as a function of one or two record--breaking cases. Specifically, the UN Oil--for--Food scandal and the wide--ranging Siemens bribery scandal alone are responsible for enforcement spikes in the period 2008--2010. As cases resulting from these massive investigations resolve, it is possible that these years will remain outliers and the trend of increased enforcement will recede. On the other hand, given that a number of companies continue to disclose investigations and the pipeline of cases the DOJ and SEC intend to resolve continues to grow, this trend is more likely to continue. In addition, the FCPA Unit of the SEC's enforcement division has markedly increased its scrutiny on compliance, through a heightened focus on assessing the sufficiency of companies' efforts to comply with the SEC's anti--bribery and books and records measures. The SEC has emphasized that corporate FCPA compliance programs must be integrated into companies' overall systems of compliance controls. In other words, companies must have in place customized compliance programs that address bribery and reporting risks specific to each individual company's business; "one size fits all" or "off the shelf" compliance programs are not deemed sufficient 30 . In the present regulatory environment in which the Sarbanes--Oxley and 
Expansion of Jurisdiction
In addition to expanded enforcement efforts through various actions, including investigations, DPAs, NPAs, and individual prosecutions, a hallmark of FCPA enforcement in the past ten years has also been an increase in enforcement against foreign issuers and nationals and a notable expansion of the basis upon which the DOJ asserts jurisdiction in FCPA enforcement. Since its introduction in 1977, the FCPA has always included elements of extra--territoriality, in that it applied to actions occurring outside the territory of the United States. However, the original statute applied only to domestic concerns and U.S. citizens and it included elements that required a territorial "nexus" to the United States for the jurisdiction of the American courts and law enforcement to apply to acts of bribery abroad. Then, the 1998 amendments to the Act expanded its jurisdiction over non--US entities. Though still requiring some territorial nexus, for the first time the 1998 amendments introduced non--U.S. issuers as subjects of the law. In addition, as it has been applied over the past decade, the definition of what constitutes a territorial "nexus" has been stretched to include ever more broad extra--territorial reach. Not only has enforcement of foreign issuers and foreign nationals increased, the DOJ and the SEC have also significantly expanded the basis upon which they argue for the required "nexus" between the foreign entity or individual and the United States. 34 A 2011 case concerning the engineering, procurement, and construction contracts to design and build a liquefied natural gas plant and related constructions on Bonny Island, Nigeria particularly illustrates the widening jurisdictional application of the FCPA. The defendant in this case, JGC Corporation, was the first Japanese company prosecuted under the FCPA and is neither a domestic U.S. concern nor an issuer of securities in the U.S. capital markets or on its exchanges. Jurisdiction was based on JGC's role in "conspiring to execute the bribery scheme with co--conspirators who are domestic concerns or issuers, and causing allegedly corrupt U.S. dollar payments to be wire transferred via correspondent bank accounts in New York". 35 In 2012 the DOJ and the SEC issued a 120--page guidance document (the "2012 Guide") to clarify for compliance purposes the FCPA's rules concerning personal jurisdiction. While confirming that issuers and domestic concerns are subject to the FCPA by virtue of nationality, and foreign entities may be subject by way of the territoriality principle for acts committed in the United States in furtherance of a violation, the 2012 Guide further asserts that FCPA jurisdiction over "a foreign 32 intention of using any U.S. means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of their bribery scheme.
Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers and Nationals
In the same month, Judge Shira Sheindlin, also of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, granted a motion to dismiss charges against Herbert Steffen, the former chief executive officer of Siemens S.A. Argentina, the Argentine subsidiary of Germany's Siemens AG, in a case in which the SEC had charged seven former executives of Siemens with a decade--long program of bribing public officials in Argentina to obtain a $1 billion contract to produce national identity cards for Argentine citizens. In this case, Judge Sheindlin agreed with the defendant's submission that Steffen, a German national, had virtually no contact with the United States (and his actions were not directed against the United States) and therefore the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.
Despite the different outcomes, both judges applied similar analyses in these cases to decide on the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court over foreign corporate bribery schemes by foreign nationals. The contrasting outcomes result from important differences in the facts of each case, not from conflicting points of law. The Sullivan decision, in particular, appears to support current DOJ and SEC theories of jurisdiction, which assert that minor or pass--through acts, such as wire transfers or emails through American correspondent bank accounts, are sufficient to establish jurisdiction, even if the money or correspondence is not knowingly or intentionally routed to the United States and do not remain in the United States for a significant length of time. 39 Moreover, although the Sheindlin decision does set limits on the personal jurisdiction of the court over non--U.S. actors, the government clearly has established -through the 2012 Guide and elsewhere -that it intends to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants accused of bribery, aiding and abetting bribery, or conspiracy to bribe, even when the defendants themselves may not be directly implicated in acts of bribery per se. 40 .
Perhaps most importantly, the Sullivan and Sheindlin decisions stand as clear exceptions to the trend in FCPA enforcement of diversion agreements. As stated above, nearly all of the criminal corporate resolutions of the past ten years have been in the form of deferred or non--prosecution agreements, while resolutions of corporate civil cases brought by the SEC mainly have consisted of administrative cease--and--desists orders and civil settlements. While for businesses, the practical consequence of these resolutions are allegations of wrongdoing, admissions of guilt in criminal 39 Lauren Ann Ross, "Using foreign relations law to limit extraterritorial application of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act", Duke Law J (November 2012) 445+. 40 Urofsky, supra note 4 at xiii.
cases, penalties, monitoring or reporting, limits of public statements, and bad publicity 41 , for the legal environment in which businesses operate, the main consequence is that DPAs and NPAs, generally, have been exempt from judicial scrutiny. 42 It may be that in "overreaching" on jurisdiction the government expects that companies will choose to settle with diversion agreements rather than to test the limits of the government's jurisdiction in court. 43 
Discussion and Implications
Why do the expansion of FCPA enforcement and extraterritoriality in FCPA enforcement matter?
What are the implications of these developments?
In (not to mention a host of U.S. and foreign law firms and consulting firms) and many others -which 41 Urofsky, supra note 4. 42 A recent decision has held that the court, pursuant to its "supervisory power", has authority to approve and oversee the implementation of DPAs, though not NPAs, which fall into the government's "absolute discretion to decide not to prosecute". This may influence the DOJ's decision to pursue NPAs as opposed to DPAs in future enforcement actions. U.S. v. HSBC Bank USA (in a non--FCPA case), Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New York. 43 Casino & Maberry, supra note 37. 
Shaping -and Constraining -International Anti--Corruption Efforts
At the same time, however, the extra--territorial application of the FCPA to ban bribery abroad raises important questions concerning the roles of power, legitimacy, justice, cooperation, efficacy, and national interest in global governance. As such it requires further scrutiny as to the impact of this legislation on the scope and direction of global anti--corruption efforts. Three aspects of FCPA enforcement in particular serve to constrain the broader goals of global anti--corruption efforts: The narrow conception of corruption upon which the FCPA is based, the strategic trade frame which underlies the FCPA's internationalization, and the legitimacy problems these suggest.
Narrow conception of corruption
Given its stringent enforcement of the FCPA, the United States stands today as the most significant promoter and enforcer of anti--corruption norms in the global economy. To the extent that U.S. leadership in the global governance of corruption is activated by FCPA enforcement, however, it fulfils this role on the basis of the specific conception of corruption included in the FCPA: transactional bribery. Specifically, the FCPA prohibits any offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of money or anything of value to any person "while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or promised, directly or indirectly, to a foreign official to influence the foreign official in his or her official capacity, induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of his or her lawful duty, or to secure any improper advantage in order to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person." 49 Transactional bribery of this sort is well--illustrated in Principal--Agent (PA) theory--based models of corruption. 50 Derived from economic theory, the PA approach models corruption as an incentive--driven individual choice within an institutional context in which institutional failure leads to a breakdown (corruption) in the optimal allocation of resources and outcomes. Put differently, in the PA model agents are presumed to act on behalf of principals that have delegated authority to them and are empowered to monitor and enforce the extent to which agents carry out the principal's interests. Corruption enters the picture when a third party whose gains or losses depend on the principal or the agent interferes with the appropriate principal--agentrelationship. In the P--A model, corruption is defined as any unauthorized transaction between an agent and a third party -usually bribery -and is an instance of institutional failure. 51
While transactional bribery certainly is the most basic and universally recognized manifestation of corruption around the world, it is only one aspect of the complex patterns and myriad forms of corruption which affect the daily lives of ordinary people. 52 Broader, network--based patterns of corruption, for example, such as kleptocratic regime practices -including outright theft from the public treasury by governing elites; the infiltration of official bodies by organized crime; election--rigging; illicit political campaign finance; and various other forms of police, judicial, and political corruption -are not necessarily structured as the kind of explicit quid--pro--quo transaction which is often assumed to be the hallmark of a corrupt relationship. In contrast to the focus on individual decision--making and institutional failure in the principal--agent based model of corruption, network--based models of corruption illuminate the non--transactional social aspects of corruption.
They focus on how informal institutions, such as culture, religion, social norms, and various kinds of personal networks can shape systemic corruption in a society . More specifically, they reveal the manner in which informal and exclusive networks based on mutual trust and reciprocity -rather than an explicit quid pro quo -conceal illicit activity within legitimate organizations and networks, and how corruption can flourish even in advanced democracies -not just in developing societies with presumably weaker bureaucratic institutions prone to bribery. In other contexts social networks based on primary interpersonal relationships such as family, kinship, and ethnicity can slant officials' exchanges and communications and shape their norms to favour close relatives and other groups or individuals over the interests of the general public, as in patrimonial and neo--patrimonial politics in countries like Afghanistan and in many African and 51 Rose--Ackerman, supra note 50; Vannucci & Porta, supra note 50; Groenendijk, supra note 50. 52 The seminal contribution on bribery remains John Thomas Noonan, Bribes (Macmillan, 1984) . Asian states. 54 Social networks based on secondary relations such as professional and religious ties can also produce non--transactional corruption in countries with more advanced bureaucracies.
Guanxi networks in China, for example, indicate the presence of direct, particularistic ties between individuals or organizations, which draw on underlying moral principles derived from the Confucian heritage -including hierarchy, interdependence, and reciprocity -to fill in governance gaps during periods of uncertain transition, relative disorder, and social inequality. 55 Guanxi and social networks like it often override the norms and desired outcomes of formal institutions and produce corruption without necessarily including specific bribery transactions. For all its vigor and surrounding rhetoric about stamping out corruption in international business, however, US enforcement of the FCPA challenges none of these corruption--network practices. Rather, it funnels 'anti--corruption' resources and attention to a narrow focus on transactional bribery in international business, in a manner that resembles the "stovepiping" which has been identified as a problem in the global governance of health. 58 "Stovepiping" in global health policy refers to a pattern in which resources are funneled down a narrow channel -say to a specific focus on HIV/Aids transmission rather than maternal health more generally -at the expense of broader goals. As Laurie Garrett has put it, stovepiping tends to reflect the interests of aid donors, 63 For instance, states can intervene by subsidizing favoured firms or industries at the input level (as with research and development [R&D] subsidies), at the output level (as with export--promotion subsidies), or by protecting firms and industries from foreign competition through tariff or non--tariff trade barriers.
64 GPE Walzenbach, Co--ordination While the study of compliance remains a central preoccupation of international legal scholarship, and is perhaps its fastest growing subfield 74 , scholars are also turning their attention to new developments in extra--territorial jurisdiction, the application of which by powerful actors has become increasingly frequent. 75 So far the literature is hampered by two large gaps: a lack of attention to the extraterritorial enforcement of anti--corruption law and a dearth of attention from political scientists and scholars of International Relations. Anti--corruption politics remain an as yet untapped subject of study on ETJ, one which is particularly ripe for an IR approach. An IR approach to anti--corruption law raises political questions about the extraterritorial enforcement of the FCPA.
Active and vigorous enforcement of the FCPA raises questions, for example, about the inconsistent application of extraterritorial jurisdiction across issue areas. Why the intense focus on bribery and corruption, but a reluctance to promote extraterritorial application of human rights laws, labor standards, environmental regulations and other areas? 76 As the U.S. Supreme Court has been scaling back extraterritorial jurisdiction driven by private litigants -the recent Morrison (securities law) and Kiobel (human rights) cases, for example -why have government agencies enforcing the FCPA been expanding its jurisdictional scope to include non--US based activities by non--US actors?
Although as a matter of law, the application of the FCPA across borders is presented as an issue of jurisdiction, the underlying matter is that of state interests and of state power. Implicating as it does competing claims to authority, and challenges to state sovereignty, ETJ in US anti--corruption Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press, 1998); Judith Lenforcement is an important topic for further study. As a key case of ETJ in contemporary global politics, the FCPA -the subject of wide--ranging and intensive scrutiny in international legal and business scholarship -deserves greater attention from political scientists. Table 1 
